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that irrespective of the contents of such documents appeals to the court
of appeals from a denial of the admission thereof to probate are not
equitable in nature and therefore do not invoke the chancery powers of
the court, requiring trials de -nova.
No Right to Purchase Mansion House Where Property
Specifically Devised
It was held in In re Reed's Estate 18 that a devise by testatrix to her
husband for life of all realty owned by testatrix in Donnelsville, Ohio,
with a remainder to testatrix' daughter, constituted a specific devise
within the statute19 giving the surviving spouse the right to purchase at
the appraised value the mansion house "if not specifically devised." Therefore, the relict husband who elected to take against the will and under the
law did not have the right to purchase at the appraised value that part of
the property specifically devised to the daughter.
Right of Murderer to Take Property Exempt From
Administration
2
In Tyack v. Tipton," where a husband murdered his wife and the
wife died intestate, it was held that the statute21 prohibiting a convicted
murderer from taking any part of the estate of the person killed, whether
under intestate succession or under the will of the victim, does not apply
to a surviving spouse's right to take property exempt from administration,
since exempt property does not come to the murderer by intestate succession.
ROBERT C. BENSING

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Procedural matters furnished the bulk of materials for judicial decisions in this field during 1953. Amenability was involved in two cases.
A husband and wife operating a grocery store employed two persons plus
an odd-job workman who had full-time employment elsewhere. The
workman was injured while installing storm windows in the private
apartment of the grocery operators. The court held that the workman
was not an employee in the regular course of business; hence the grocery
Th65 Ohio L. Abs. 129, 114 N.E.2d 314 (Clark Probate 1952).
'OHio REv. CODE § 2113.38 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 10509-89).
:°65 Ohio L Abs. 397, 115 N.E.2d 29 (App. 1951)
=OHio REv. CODE

§ 2105.19

(OHIo GEN. CODE § 10503-17).
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operation did not employ the three or more persons required for amenability.1
In proceedings by the state to collect an Industrial Commission award
for an employee from a non-complying employer, the question of amenability cannot be raised when the issue was settled in the prior proceedings which determined the award.2
When the factual issue of right to participate in the State Insurance
Fund has been determined against the claimant by the common pleas
court, on appeal, the court of appeals can, at most, reverse on the weight
of the evidence and remand. It cannot hold as a matter of law that the
claimant is entitled to participate.3 The supreme court will also deny a
mandamus writ to order the Industrial Commission to find that no injury
was received in the course of and arising out of the employment. This
issue of fact is within the Commission's jurisdiction for determination.4
The statute of limitations allowing two years after the injury in which
to file a claim will not permit a modification of an award to include a
new back injury. No evidence of its relation to the original injury was
presented; a new and distinct injury was barred because the two years
period had expired. 5 The Industrial Commission, however, has authority
to change an award, if acted upon in a timely manner, from a temporary
partial disability to a temporary total disability. Substantial evidence of
error in the initial order is required for this alteration."
Two cases presented important decisions on the crucial medical testimony for a workmen's compensation claim. A doctor who attended the
claimant was held not precluded by the physician-patient privilege in
giving expert testimony for the Commission in response to a hypothetical
question. What the doctor had learned or observed while attending the
7
workman and opinions formed therefrom must be disregarded, however.
But for a doctor to testify as to the correctness of another physician's
testimony and to state his own conclusion as to what the other physician
found, invades the province of the trier of fact- the jury. Such testimony is incompetent.8
'Hoffman v. Powell, 94 Ohio App. 80, 114 N.E.2d 593 (1952).
'State v. Hinkle, 113 N.E.2d 146 (Summit Com. P1. 1953).
'Miller v. Industrial Comm'n, 158 Ohio St. 551, 110 N.E.2d 481 (1953).
'State ex rel. New Way Family Laundry v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 N.E.2d 406
(Ohio App. 1952).
'Miller v. Spicer Mfg. Co., 159 Ohio St. 571, 113 N.E.2d 4 (1953)
' State ex rel. Kilroy Struct. Steel Co. v. Morse, 159 Ohio St. 372, 112 N.E.2d 322
(1953).
"Strzak v. Industrial Comm'n, 159 Ohio St. 475, 112 N.E.2d 537 (1953).
'Fox v. Industrial Conm'n, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 343, 114 N.E.2d 451 (Muskingum

Com. P1. 1953).
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In applying the New York workmen's compensation law, the Ohio
Court of Appeals held that the two year statute of limitations barred the
personal injury claims of the workman's assignee as against the tortfeasor.
New York general law gives a six year limitation period for causes of action
created by statute. Workmen's compensation is not such a cause of action.
Common law personal injury rights, not new statutory causes of action, are
the foundation for workmen's compensation.'
Substantive issues in 1953 included causal relations between the accident
incident and the claimant's physical or mental condition, who was an employee and what is an accident in the course of and arising out of employment.
A worker subjected to police investigation on the suspicion that his
truck injured a pedestrian, suffered a cerebral hemorrhage claimed to be
caused by anxiety and worry. Such injury was not compensable. 10 No
causal connection could be established where the expert medical witness
answered a hypothetical question which included the fact that claimant's
exertion was a normal exertion and not an unusual one.11 Likewise, where
a hypothetical question to the doctor included the fact that dust particles
entered claimant's eye on a certain day, a fact not testified to, a verdict
that plaintiff contracted purulent conjunctivitis and should participate in
the fund cannot be supported.' 2 Also, it is proper to charge the jury that
before a claimant can participate in compensation benefits for an eye injury, a 25% loss of vision must be proved under the statute. 3
When a novelty manufacturer furnished materials and told workers what
to do and how to do it, the workers were employees for purposes of workmen's compensation coverage even though the work was done in the workers' homes because a fire had destroyed the plant. 4
An ice company's night supervisor was killed while a pedestrian some
distance from the plant during work hours. When a worker has a fixed
situs for work and is killed at a distance from it, the presumption is that
death did not occur in the course of or arise out of the employment. Evidence to the contrary is necessary to refute."
OLIvER SCHROEDER, JR.
'Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 91 Ohio App. 573, 109
N.E.2d 287 (1952).
"Toth v. Standard Oil Co. 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953)
Heath v. Standard Oil Co., 112 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio App. 1953)
"Peterchak v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 92 Ohio App. 431, 109 N.E.2d 509
(1951).
" Bacet v. Nat. Tube Co., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 80, 113 N.E.2d 925 (App. 1952)
'Look v. Hinkle, 113 N.E.2d 611 (Summit Com. PL. 1950)
'Jump v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 92 Ohio App. 329, 110 N.E.2d 29 (1952)

